In two experiments, human participants performed a causal judgment task that simultaneously comprised two reciprocal patterning discriminations and a biconditional discrimination. They learned both patterning discriminations more quickly than the biconditional discrimination. Postdiscrimination tests were used to identify participants who had, or had not, learned to apply the patterning rules, as well as participants who continued to expect summation when presented with two cues that predicted the same outcome. All groups were faster to learn the patterning than the biconditional discriminations. These results are inconsistent with models of stimulus representation that invoke configural representations (e.g., Pearce, 1987 Pearce, , 1994 ) because these models solve biconditional discriminations more readily than patterning discriminations.
A challenge to most models of Pavlovian conditioning is to explain how animals solve patterning and biconditional discriminations (e.g., Pavlov, 1927; Rescorla, 1972 Rescorla, , 1973 Saavedra, 1975; Whitlow & Wagner, 1972) . In patterning discriminations, each of two conditioned stimuli (CSs) individually signals an outcome whereas the compound of those same stimuli signals the opposite outcome. In "negative patterning" the individual stimuli are reinforced but their compound is not (Aϩ and Bϩ trials are intermixed with AB-trials); in "positive patterning" the compound is reinforced and the individual stimuli are not (CDϩ vs. C-/D-). In a biconditional discrimination, four stimuli are presented as four pairwise compounds, two of which are reinforced (WXϩ and YZϩ) and two are not reinforced (WZ-and YX-) . Thus, each stimulus is presented within one reinforced compound and one nonreinforced compound. The important property of these discriminations is that they cannot be solved by a process that distributes excitatory and/or inhibitory associative strength among the CSs themselves.
A popular solution to this problem, described by Spence (1952) , asserts that a compound of two stimuli constitutes more than the sum of its parts-the conjunction of two stimuli provides a unique configural pattern in addition to the individual stimulus elements. This solution was incorporated by Wagner and Rescorla (1972) into their model of associative learning, and provided the first comprehensive description of how these discriminations could be learned. More recently, Pearce (1987 Pearce ( , 1994 Pearce ( , 2002 ) has proposed a model of stimulus representation that puts configural representation center-stage, rather than as an added feature whose explanatory function is confined to dealing with difficult conditional discriminations. Pearce has argued that all associative learning operates exclusively on configural representations, be they representing a compound or a single CS. This approach is readily equipped to explain patterning and biconditional discriminations because each trial type is represented by a different configural unit that acquires excitatory or inhibitory strength depending on the reinforcement schedule. To account for the difficulty of these discriminations, Pearce has proposed a generalization rule that defines how one stimulus input (e.g., the compound AB) partially activates the configural units representing other input patterns (e.g., A and B as individual stimuli) in addition to activation of its own configural unit.
There are alternative approaches that do not invoke configural solutions to patterning and biconditional discriminations. These approaches consider stimuli to be represented by their multiple elemental features, and thus any compound is represented solely by its stimulus elements. One such model, proposed by Mackintosh (2000, 2002) , assumes that any two stimuli share a substantial portion (at least 50%) of their features in common. Crucially, these common elements provide a mechanism to solve patterning and biconditional discriminations if it is assumed that they are not doubly activated when the two stimuli are presented together as a compound.
1 For example, negative patterning can be solved if the common elements acquire excitatory associative strength and the distinctive elements of each stimulus acquire inhibitory strength (a similar argument was also considered by 1 McLaren and Mackintosh use a sigmoid function to describe the relationship between the physical intensity of a stimulus feature and the strength to which the corresponding element is activated. According to this description, a common element that is only weakly activated by the individual stimuli may be activated strongly by the compound, and conversely, a common element that is activated strongly by either single stimulus may be activated to the same level by the compound. The first of these elements functions as an added configural element, being present in the compound but virtually absent from the individual CSs. However, the second element is of particular interest here, because it constitutes a functionally distinct mechanism that can solve conditional discriminations. Rescorla, 1972) . Harris (2006) has offered an alternative account to explain how a purely elemental mechanism can solve these discriminations. In this model, a limited-capacity attention buffer regulates the activation weight of stimulus elements. This provides the necessary nonlinearity in the way that elements are active during single versus compound stimuli to solve patterning and biconditional discriminations.
All of the models considered above can solve patterning and biconditional discriminations but differ in the relative ease of their solutions. Models invoking configural representations predict that biconditional discriminations are solved more quickly than patterning discriminations (particularly negative patterning). More specifically, for the added configural cue theories Wagner & Brandon, 2001; , negative patterning can only be solved when the added configural cue acquires sufficient inhibitory strength to oppose the summed excitatory strengths of the individual CSs. In the biconditional task, by contrast, two configural cues acquire inhibitory strength and two acquire excitatory strength, and accurate performance (more responding to reinforced than nonreinforced compounds) is achieved as soon as the configural cues acquire any excitatory or inhibitory strength. Pearce's (1987 Pearce's ( , 1994 model also predicts biconditional discriminations to be easier than patterning discriminations because its generalization rule produces greater generalization between two individual CSs and their compound (as occurs in negative patterning) than between different compounds that contain a common component (as in a biconditional discrimination).
Elemental models, on the other hand, can predict that patterning discriminations will be solved more quickly than biconditional discriminations. This is particularly clear in the model proposed by Harris (2006) . In this model, the strongest (i.e., most salient) elements of a stimulus enter the attention buffer (thus gaining a boost to their activation weight) when the stimulus is presented on its own or in a compound, but weaker elements can only enter the buffer during single stimulus presentations because they cannot compete with the larger number of salient elements present in the compound. It is these weaker elements that provide the basis for discriminating a compound from its component CSs, and in the case of negative patterning, the solution relies on the weaker elements acquiring excitatory strength at the expense of the stronger elements (that eventually become inhibitory). The biconditional discrimination poses a greater problem for this model because all stimulus patterns are compounds and thus the level of competition for entry to the attention buffer is relatively constant. Nonetheless, incidental differences between stimuli in the distribution of their element weights could allow a small number of elements of any stimulus to gain entry to the buffer in one compound but not another, and thus provide a means of solving the discrimination. Further, if the stimuli share any elements in common, these will be disproportionately represented in the buffer during compound presentations, and thus improve discrimination between compounds. Our simulations of the McLaren and Mackintosh (2002) model tend to solve biconditional discriminations sooner than patterning discriminations, but this difference in difficulty is sensitive to the proportion of elements assumed to be common between the stimuli. When the stimuli share a very large proportion of their elements (90% or more), patterning discriminations become easier than biconditional discriminations.
The objective of the present experiments was to compare the difficulty posed by patterning and biconditional discriminations, and so test between the different accounts described above. This was done using causal judgment tasks with human participants. These tasks are particularly well suited because they allow eight different stimuli to be used, and thus both types of discrimination can be trained concurrently in a within-subject design. In both experiments, the participants were required to learn about 10 different "events" (comprising single or compound cues) and two opposite outcomes (O1 and O2). Four of the eight cues were randomly allocated to two patterning discriminations with opposite outcome contingencies (A3 O1/B3 O1 vs. AB3 O2; and C3 O2/D3 O2 vs. CD3 O1). The other four cues were randomly allocated to a biconditional discrimination (WX3 O1, YZ3 O1, WZ3 O2, YX3 O2). On each trial, the participants were presented with one or two stimuli and rated their expectancy of either outcome.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 used a variant of the "allergist" task commonly used to study causal learning in humans. The participants were exposed to contingent relations between 10 different "events" and two outcomes-the consumption of one or two varieties of wine by a fictional character, leading to the character suffering a hangover or no hangover the following day. Four of the eight wine names were randomly allocated to two patterning discriminations and the other four wine names were randomly allocated to a biconditional discrimination. On each trial, the participants were presented with one or two wine names and rated their expectancy of a hangover, before being informed of the outcome.
Method
Participants. The participants were 159 undergraduate students enrolled in a third year Learning and Behavior course at the University of Sydney in 2006. They were naïve to the purposes of the experiment, and were yet to learn about conditional discriminations. The experiment was conducted as part of a tutorial practical (10 classes in all). Data about the age and sex of the students had been collected in previous weeks: approximately 75% of the participants were female, and the mean age was 22 years.
Procedure. Each participant sat at an eMac computer station, and read a cover story explaining the scenario of the causal judgment task (see Appendix A). During the experiment, on each trial the participants would see the name of one or two varieties of wine, and were asked to rate on 10-point scale the likelihood that the fictitious character would have a hangover the following day. They were instructed to give a rating of zero if certain there would be no hangover, and 10 if certain there would be a hangover. After the participant provided their rating, a new screen would report the outcome. This was repeated 30 times for each of the 10 types of trial (Aϩ, Bϩ, AB-, C-, D-, CDϩ, WXϩ, YZϩ, WZ-, YX-), giving a total of 300 trials. Within a cycle of 10 trials, the order of each trial type was random. The eight different types of wine (four red and four white) were Shiraz, Merlot, Cabernet, Grenache, Riesling, Chardonnay, Pinot, and Semillon. For each participant, the eight wines were randomly allocated as A, B, C, D, W, X, Y, and Z. The participants proceeded through the experiment at their own pace. Different participants completed two slightly different versions of the experiment (according to class attendance). In one version (n ϭ 87), on trials with two types of wine, the relative position of the wine names was randomized from trial to trial (e.g., Grenache was above or below Riesling). In the other condition (n ϭ 72), the wines were always shown in the same position (e.g., Grenache always above Riesling). This variation was designed to test the hypothesis that fixing the position of the wine names would facilitate configural solutions because the order of the names would be a salient configural cue. It was predicted that any consequence of using a configural representation should be greater in the second group of subjects than in the first. When fixing the position of the wine names in the biconditional discrimination, a given wine occupied the same position in both compounds (i.e., W was above both X and Z, and similarly Y was above Z and X). This was done so that the participants could not use the position of a single wine name as a cue to the outcome.
Results
The ratings were analyzed by mixed-model ANOVA. Three within-subjects factors were analyzed: (1) type of discrimination (comparing between the two patterning discriminations, and comparing both patterning discriminations with the biconditional discrimination); (2) trial outcome (comparing hangover and no hangover trials); and (3) trial (testing linear and quadratic trends across Trials 1 to 30). There was one two-level between-subjects factor: whether the two wine names in a compound were presented in randomly varying order or fixed order. However, there was no overall difference between the two groups (F Ͻ 1). The only significant interaction between this factor and any within-subjects factor was that the two groups differed in overall linear trend across trials (F 1,157 ϭ 4.20, p ϭ .042; the interaction between groups and quadratic trend also approached significance, F 1,157 ϭ 3.12, p ϭ .079). However, because this overall trend collapses ratings across both the outcome and discrimination factors, it has little meaning with respect to the rate at which the participants learned the discriminations (and indeed, there were no overall trends across trials, Fs Ͻ 1). All other interactions involving the between-subjects factor did not approach significance (highest F 1,157 ϭ 2.10, p ϭ .123). Thus, contrary to prediction, performance on the discrimination tasks did not change in any meaningful way whether the compound wine names were presented in fixed or varying order.
The rating scores for each trial type, averaged over the two groups, are shown in Figure 1 . The ANOVA revealed that there was a significant difference in overall ratings between trials followed by a hangover and trials followed by no hangover (F 1,157 ϭ 1639.93, p Ͻ .001), and there were also significant interactions between the outcome factor and both linear and quadratic trends across trials (Fs 1,157 ϭ 1439.36 and 480.67, ps Ͻ .001). These simply confirm that the participants learned to respond accurately to the discriminations.
The ANOVA also identified a significant overall difference in ratings between the two patterning discriminations (F 1,157 ϭ 78.09, p Ͻ .001). This was accompanied by a two-way interaction between these discriminations and linear trend across trials (F 1,157 ϭ 18.82, p Ͻ .001). The significant effects bear out the observation that, for both patterning discriminations, the ratings changed more quickly for the single CSs (i.e., the ratings increased quickly for Aϩ and Bϩ trials, and decreased quickly for C-and Dtrials) than for the compound stimuli (AB-and CDϩ). This identifies an asymmetry in generalization between single and compound CSs-there was greater generalization from Aϩ and Bϩ trials to AB-trials than vice versa, and there was greater generalization from C-and D-trials to CDϩ than vice versa. In this respect, however, the two discriminations were perfectly symmetrical, confirmed by the fact that there was no two-way interaction between the two patterning discriminations and the factor of outcome (F Ͻ 1). In other words, the participants mastered the two discriminations at equal rates.
There was no difference in overall ratings between the two patterning discriminations and the biconditional discrimination (F Ͻ 1). This comparison did, however, interact significantly with the factor outcome (F 1,157 ϭ 90.96, p Ͻ .001) indicating that the participants' ratings differed between hangover and no-hangover trials more for the patterning discriminations than for the biconditional discrimination. There was also a significant three-way interaction between the discrimination types, the outcome, and quadratic trend across trials (F 1,157 ϭ 39.12, p Ͻ .001). This triple interaction bears out the observation that the ratings changed to differentiate between hangover and nohangover trials more quickly, and reached asymptote sooner, for the two patterning discriminations than the biconditional discrimination. In other words, the patterning discriminations were learned faster. 
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that participants can solve two patterning discriminations more quickly than a concurrent biconditional discrimination. This finding is inconsistent with the predictions of associative learning models that assume these discriminations are solved by the use of configural representations (Pearce, 1994; . However, the relevance of this finding to those associative models depends upon the extent to which the participants' solution to these discriminations followed standard associative processes. In particular, there are two plausible ways in which the participants' learning may have deviated from these processes. First, some or all of the participants may have discovered the rule that defines the patterning schedules-that a compound of two events leads to the opposite outcome to that signaled by the individual events (Shanks & Darby, 1998) . This could have improved their performance on those discriminations selectively, thus confounding appropriate comparison between the patterning and biconditional tasks. The second way in which the participants' learning may have deviated from standard associative processes is if they were to treat each half of the patterning schedules as belonging to different discriminations. That is, they may have treated single-event trials as being distinct from compound trials, and thus ABϩ and CD-trials would be unrelated to A-, B-, Cϩ, and Dϩ trials. This would reduce, or even eliminate, generalization between the patterning compounds and their component cues, thereby reducing the difficulty posed by those discrimination schedules. Again, this would undermine the relevance of the results from Experiment 1 to associative models.
Experiment 2 was designed to address both of the issues raised above. Participants were required to learn two patterning discriminations and a biconditional discrimination, as in Experiment 1. This was followed by a series of posttraining tests aimed at identifying participants whose performance conformed to standard associative processes, as distinct from participants who may have deviated from these processes in either of the aforementioned ways. A new scenario was developed to provide a greater range of predictive cues so that new cues could be used in the posttraining tests. In this scenario, participants were given mock demographic information about fictional schoolchildren, and were required to learn which variables predicted high versus low literacy.
The first two posttraining tests used a two-alternative forcedchoice task to identify participants who continued to show summation when two variables were combined as a compound. In these tests the participants were informed about two new demographic variables that led to the same literacy level (H3 High and J3 High in Test 1; K3 Low and L3 Low in Test 2). They were then asked to predict which of two new children would have higher literacy; one of the children was described by one of the two variables (H in Test 1; K in Test 2) and the other child was described by both variables (HJ in Test 1; KL in Test 2). A participant who expects that the predictive strength of two individual variables generalizes to their compound should show summation, and therefore he or she should choose HJ over H, but chose K over KL. In contrast, a participant who has discovered the patterning rule would make the opposite choices, anticipating low literacy for HJ and high for KL. Likewise, a participant who does not know the patterning rule, but nonetheless does not generalize between single variables and their compound, should be unsure of the literacy level signified by HJ and KL. Therefore, this participant should choose H over HJ, because he or she knows that H predicts high literacy, and chose KL over K because K predicts low literacy.
The use of patterning rules was assessed by additional transfer tests similar to those developed by Shanks and Darby (1998) . Participants rated the likelihood of low or high literacy in a child described by two variables that individually signaled the same literacy level (both high or both low). This procedure was used to identify participants who could apply the biconditional rule: participants were given information about two children each described by two variables (QR3 High, and QS3 Low), and were asked to predict the literacy of a third child described by two variables (ST3?). Finally, the participants were asked three direct questions about their knowledge of the patterning and biconditional rules.
There was one additional difference between this experiment and the preceding one: in this experiment, on trials with a single demographic variable, that variable was duplicated. This was done to reduce the distinctiveness of single-variable trials (i.e., all trials contained two lines of text describing the fictional schoolchildren), and thereby reduce the likelihood that participants would treat each half of the patterning schedule as unrelated discrimination problems.
Method
Participants. The participants were 165 undergraduate students enrolled in a third year Learning and Behavior course at the University of Sydney in 2007 (66% were female; mean age was 21.5 years). They were naïve to the purposes of the experiment, and were yet to learn about conditional discriminations (168 students completed the experiment, but 3 were excluded because they had also completed Experiment 1 when enrolled in the same course the previous year). The experiment was conducted as part of a tutorial practical (11 classes in all).
Procedure. Each participant sat at an eMac computer station, and read a cover story explaining the scenario of the causal judgment task (see Appendix B). During the experiment, on each trial the participant would be given the initials of a fictitious child, accompanied by a single demographic variable, duplicated, or two different demographic variables. The participant had to rate on a visual-analogue scale from Ϫ10 to ϩ10 the likelihood that the child would have higher than average literacy (where ϩ10 indicated definitely high literacy) or lower than average literacy (-10 indicated definitely low literacy). The initials (and thus the fictitious child) changed on every trial; the participants were informed this would happen and were instructed to attend to the descriptive variables rather than the initials when making their prediction. After the participant provided the rating, a line of text appeared (while the rating remained on the screen) informing the participant of the literacy level (as a binary outcome: high or low). This was repeated 20 times for each of the 10 types of trial (A3 High, B3 High, AB3 Low; C3 Low, D3 Low, CD3 High; WX3 High, YZ3 High, WZ3 Low, YX3 Low), giving a total of 200 trials. Within a cycle of 10 trials, the order of each trial type was random. The eight different demographic variables were pseudorandomly sampled from a pool of 20 variables (see Appendix C). The constraint on the sampling was that similar variables (e.g., "mother is a pharmacist" vs. "mother is an accountant") were selected as a pair and one was assigned to a patterning schedule and the other to the biconditional schedule. This was done to avoid the possibility that any child was described by two mutually inconsistent variables. Progress through the experiment was selfpaced.
After completing the 200 training trials, the participants completed six transfer tests and answered three direct questions about rule knowledge. Before commencing these tests, the participants were given the instruction: "Any general rules of thumb that you were using to guide your answers in the previous phase could still be applicable here, and you should use them where possible. However, the demographic information presented in this phase will be different from what you have been viewing so far" (see Appendix D for full instructions and example of test screen). In each transfer test, a single screen presented information about two children; the children were described by new demographic variables and their literacy level was also revealed. On the same screen, the participants were asked to judge the literacy of one or two new children, described by combinations of the same demographic variables. They were not provided with feedback on their answers.
Transfer Tests 1 and 2 assessed summation. On each test, the first two children were described by different single variables (the variables were duplicated, as for single-variable trials during training) but had the same literacy level (both high in Test 1; both low in Test 2). The identities of a third and fourth child were also presented, one child was described by both of the above variables, and the other child was described by only one of those variables (duplicated). The participant had to choose which of these latter two children would have higher literacy, and rate their confidence in this choice (from 0 to 10). Thus, Test 1 took the form HH3 High and JJ3 High, and participants then compared HJ versus H; Test 2 took the form KK3 Low and LL3 Low, and participants then compared KL versus K.
Transfer Tests 3 and 4 were similar to 1 and 2, respectively, except that a new set of variables was used and participants did not choose between a third and fourth child. Instead they were given the identity of a third child which was described by the combination of variables that described the first two children, and were asked to rate the literacy of that child on the same scale used during training. Thus, Test 3 took the form HH3 High and JJ3 High, and participants then predicted the literacy for HJ; Test 4 took the form KK3 Low and LL3 Low, and participants predicted the literacy for KL.
The fifth and sixth transfer tests used a similar means to test for use of a biconditional rule. A single screen presented information about two children each described by two different (new) variables, but one of these variables was common to both children and the children had opposite literacy levels. The same screen asked the participants to rate the literacy of a third child described by one of the previous variables (but not the common one) and a fourth variable. Thus, Test 5 took the form QR3 High and RS3 Low, and participants then predicted the literacy for ST; Test 6 took the form QR3 High and RS3 Low, and participants then predicted the literacy for QT. (Knowledge of the biconditional rule would lead to a prediction of high literacy on Test 5 and low literacy on Test 6.) Finally, the participants were asked to respond, yes or no, to three direct questions about their knowledge of the patterning and biconditional rules. The first question asked: "Did you notice that, generally speaking, if variable A by itself predicted high literacy and variable B by itself predicted high literacy, then the combination of variables A and B together predicted low literacy?" The second question asked: "Did you notice that, generally speaking, if variable A by itself predicted low literacy and variable B by itself predicted low literacy, then the combination of variables A and B together predicted high literacy?" The third question asked: "Did you notice that, generally speaking, if variables A and B together predicted high literacy and variables C and D together predicted high literacy, then A and C together or B and D together predicted low literacy?"
Results
The ratings were analyzed by mixed-model ANOVA. As in Experiment 1, three within-subjects factors were analyzed: (1) type of discrimination (comparing between the two patterning discriminations, and comparing both patterning discriminations with the biconditional discrimination); (2) literacy (comparing high and low literacy trials); and (3) trial (testing linear and quadratic trends across Trials 1 to 20). The rating scores averaged over all participants are shown in the upper plot in Figure 2 . The ANOVA revealed that there was a significant difference in overall ratings between low literacy and high literacy trials (F 1,164 ϭ 397.89, p Ͻ .001). There were also significant interactions between literacy and both linear and quadratic trends across trials (Fs 1,164 ϭ 571.35 and 34.16, ps Ͻ .001). These results confirm that the participants learned to respond accurately to the discriminations.
There was a significant interaction between literacy and the contrast comparing two patterning discriminations with the biconditional discrimination (F 1,164 ϭ 133.89, p Ͻ .001) indicating that the participants were better at discriminating between high and low literacy trials from the patterning schedules than from the biconditional schedule. There were also significant three-way interactions between the discrimination types (patterning vs. biconditional), literacy, and trends across trials (for the linear trend, F 1,164 ϭ 15.06, p Ͻ .001; for the quadratic trend, F 1,164 ϭ 25.51, p Ͻ .001). These triple interactions bear out the observation that the ratings changed to differentiate between high and low literacy trials more quickly, and reached asymptote sooner, for the two patterning discriminations than for the biconditional discrimination. In other words, the patterning discriminations were learned faster.
The ANOVA identified a significant two-way interaction between literacy and the contrast comparing the two patterning discriminations (F 1,164 ϭ 18.14, p Ͻ .001), but there were no significant three-way interactions between these factors and trends across trials (F Ͻ 1 for linear trend; F 1,164 ϭ 3.68, p ϭ .057 for quadratic trend). The two-way interaction shows that participants were more accurate at predicting literacy levels on trials from one patterning schedule (A3 Low and B3 Low vs. AB3 High) than from the reciprocal patterning schedule (C3 High and D3 High vs. CD3 Low). This observation is surprising because we intended that the two schedules were symmetrical. It indicates that, for these participants, the literacy scale was not uniform (linear) but that the outcome of high literacy was more salient than the outcome of low literacy. This asymmetry may be related to another unexpected observation in this data, that participants showed an overall bias toward predicting high literacy (t 164 ϭ 9.13, p Ͻ .001; see Figure 2 ).
Posttraining transfer tests were used to identify different types of participants. Conservative criteria were used to classify the participants, which meant that many were not classified as belonging to either of two reciprocal categories (e.g., as rule-using vs. nonrule participants). Because the essential pattern of the data did not differ between different categories of participants (see below), we assume that the unclassified participants showed the same trends. To simplify reporting of the different data sets for these analyses, we will only report the outcome of three statistical tests: the two-way interaction between discrimination type (both patterning schedules vs. the biconditional schedule) and literacy level, and the three-way interactions between these same two factors and trends (linear and quadratic) across training trials. The first analysis tests for differences in accuracy (discriminating between low and high literacy variables) between the two types of discrimination schedule across the entire training block. The second and third analyses test for the emergence of this difference across the course of training.
The most important group of participants was that who showed summation on both Transfer Tests 1 and 2. Thirty-five participants conformed to this description (i.e., they chose HJ over H, and K over KL). Most of these participants gave high confidence ratings about their judgments, but some gave low ratings (M ϭ 6.2, on a scale where zero means completely uncertain and 10 means completely certain). Therefore, to isolate only those participants who clearly showed summation on these tests, we only included the 27 participants who gave an average confidence rating above five for their two choices (their mean confidence rating ϭ 7.3). The scores during training for these 27 participants are shown in Figure 3 . Their performance during training reflected the general trend of all participants (see Figure 3 ) in that they were more accurate in predicting literacy on trials from the two patterning discriminations than on trials from the biconditional discrimination. This observation was confirmed by a significant interaction between discrimination type (patterning vs. biconditional) and literacy level (F 1,26 ϭ 34.59 p Ͻ .001), and by significant three-way interaction between these variables and linear trend across training trials (F 1,26 ϭ 4.42, p ϭ .045). There was not a significant interaction between literacy, discrimination type, and quadratic trend across trials (F 1,26 ϭ 1.61, p ϭ .216), indicating that these participants did not reach asymptotic performance on any of the discriminations.
Two transfer tests (Tests 3 and 4) were used to identify participants who had learned to apply the patterning rule. To identify participants who did, and participants who did not, apply the patterning rules, we adopted the following criteria. Rule-using participants gave ratings below Ϫ5 on Test 3 (i.e., they gave firm predictions of low literacy to a compound of two variables that individually signaled high literacy) and gave ratings above ϩ5 on Test 4 (they gave firm predictions of high literacy to a compound of two variables that individually signaled low literacy). Conversely, nonrule participants were defined as those who gave ratings above ϩ5 on Test 3 and below Ϫ5 on Test 4. Based on these criteria, 29 participants were assessed as using a rule, and 34 were assessed as nonrule participants. Their performance during the training phase is shown in the upper plots of Figure 4 . As for the previous analyses, both groups performed better on the patterning discriminations than on the biconditional discrimination. For each group, there was significant interaction between discrimination type and literacy level (for rule-users F 1,28 ϭ 43.83, p Ͻ .001; for nonrule participants F 1,33 ϭ 17.73, p Ͻ .001). The three-way interactions between these variables and both linear and quadratic trends across training trials were significant for ruleusing participants (for linear trend, F 1,28 ϭ 6.20, p ϭ .019; for quadratic trend F 1,28 ϭ 8.51, p ϭ .007); however, for nonrule participants only the three-way interaction with quadratic trend was significant (F 1,33 ϭ 11.27, p ϭ .002; for linear trend F Ͻ 1).
The participants were also asked directly if they were aware of either of the patterning rules. Fifty-five participants (33%) answered "yes" to both questions, and 77 (47%) answered "no" to both questions. Their performance on the training phase is shown in the lower plots of Figure 4 . Once again, both groups performed better on the patterning discrimination than on the biconditional discrimination. For each group, there was significant interaction between discrimination type and literacy level (for rule-users F 1,54 ϭ 88.76, p Ͻ .001; for nonrule participants F 1,76 ϭ 45.05, p Ͻ .001). The three-way interactions between these variables and both linear and quadratic trends across training trials were significant for nonrule participants (for linear trend, F 1,76 ϭ 14.14, p ϭ .001; for quadratic trend F 1,76 ϭ 22.87, p Ͻ .001), but for ruleusing participants only the three-way interaction with quadratic tend was significant (F 1,54 ϭ 11.73, p ϭ .001; for linear trend F 1,54 ϭ 3.36, p ϭ .072).
Finally, the participants completed two transfer tests (Tests 5 and 6) designed to assess use of the biconditional rule, and were also asked directly if they were aware of that rule. Forty-one participants (25%) answered "yes" to the direct question. However, only 23 participants (14%) gave ratings in the correct direction on the two transfer tests (i.e., they gave a rating above zero for Test 5 and below zero for Test 6). To compare how easily participants deduced the biconditional rule versus the patterning rules, we counted the number of participants who passed increasingly strict criteria used to define use of each rule in the transfer tests. The most lax criterion required that the participants respond in the correct direction on both tests, such that their rating was Ͻ0 when the rule predicted low literacy (Test 3 for the patterning rule, and Test 6 for the biconditional rule), and their rating was Ͼ0 when the rule predicted high literacy (Test 4 for the patterning rule, and Test 5 for the biconditional rule). We continued to assess participants across a range of criteria that increased in single steps (e.g., Ͻ-1 and Ͼϩ1; Ͻ-2 and Ͼϩ2; etc.) toward the most extreme ratings (Ͻ-9 and Ͼϩ9). Figure 5 shows the number of participants conforming to each criterion for the patterning rules and for the biconditional rule. Clearly many more participants had deduced the patterning rules than the biconditional rules for each criterion. The difference at each criterion was significant according to chisquare (smallest 2 ϭ 5.39, p Ͻ .05). This shows that the participants were much less likely to deduce the biconditional rule during their training phase than both patterning rules.
General Discussion
The objective of the experiments described here was to compare the difficulty posed by patterning and biconditional discrimina- tions. We did this to test among several different theoretical accounts that have been offered to describe how these discriminations might be solved by simple associative mechanisms. In Experiment 1, participants learned two patterning discriminations with reciprocal contingencies faster than they learned a biconditional discrimination. This finding was replicated in Experiment 2, which additionally tested whether the difference in difficulty posed by the patterning versus biconditional discriminations was related to different strategies that the participants used to learn the tasks. Specifically, Experiment 2 used a series of posttraining tests to distinguish between participants who reported that they were aware of the patterning rules, or were able to apply those rules, versus participants who were unaware or did not apply the rules. It is reasonable to expect that participants who understood the patterning rules would have shown improved accuracy on trials from those discriminations. If those participants did not understand or apply the rule that defines the biconditional discrimination, this difference in rule awareness could account for the difference in discrimination performance on the tasks. In support of this argument, Experiment 2 showed that many more participants were able to apply the patterning rule than the biconditional rule, and participants who were aware of or applied the patterning rule performed better on the patterning discriminations than on the biconditional discrimination. However, in this experiment, participants who reported that they were unaware of the patterning rules, and participants who did not use the patterning rules on transfer tests, also performed better on the patterning discriminations than on the biconditional discrimination. Therefore, the difference in difficulty of the two tasks was not related to knowledge or use of the patterning rule. Experiment 2 investigated another possible reason why participants might learn the patterning discriminations faster than the biconditional discrimination. If they treated single-cue trials and compound trials as belonging to different discrimination tasks, this would reduce generalization between those trial types. In this case, the patterning discriminations would be easier because participants would effectively learn two relatively straightforward discriminations: Aϩ and Bϩ versus C-and D-, and AB-versus CDϩ. From this perspective, it would not be surprising that participants would learn these discriminations faster than the complex biconditional discrimination. Experiment 2 used two posttraining tests to discover whether participants did use such a strategy. In these tests, the participants were presented with two new cues and informed of their outcome (Hϩ and Jϩ in Test 1; K-and L-in Test 2). They were then asked to choose whether the outcome was more likely to be associated with one of the cues on its own or with the compound of both cues (i.e., H vs. HJ; K vs. KL). If a participant's expectation of the outcome did not generalize from single cues to the compound, they should have chosen H over HJ, and KL over K when asked to judge the likelihood of the positive outcome (and they should have made these same choices if they had understood the patterning rules). Although many participants did make such choices, 35 participants made the opposite choices, and 27 of these gave high confidence ratings in those choices. In other words, these participants did generalize between single and compound cues, showing summation of their expectations. Once again, these participants performed better on the two patterning discriminations than on the biconditional discrimination. Therefore, the difference in difficulty between the two types of discrimination was not because of the fact that some participants may have failed to show summation between single events and their compound (that might otherwise simplify learning of the patterning discriminations), just as it was not dependent on participants learning the rule that defines the patterning schedule. Rather, we conclude that at least some participants were solving these discriminations by learning associative relationships between the cues and outcomes.
The present results do not support configural models of stimulus representation. The added configural element hypothesis (Spence, 1952) , as incorporated into the Rescorla-Wagner model , predicts that biconditional discriminations will be mastered much more quickly than patterning discriminations (as shown by the simulation in Figure  6 ). One reason for this prediction is that the model assumes complete generalization of associative strength between single CSs and their compound, which impairs mastery of the patterning discriminations. Although this assumption has been relaxed in a more recent version (Wagner, 2003; Wagner & Brandon, 2001 ), the modified model still predicts more rapid mastery of the biconditional discrimination because it relies on compound configural elements to solve these discriminations. Thus, the biconditional discrimination is solved faster because it contains more configural elements than are available in the patterning discriminations. Nonetheless, this type of model could anticipate greater difficulty with biconditional than patterning discriminations if the representational mechanism were specified such that compounds that share a common stimulus also share configural elements. For example, if some of the configural elements in WX were common to WZ, this would increase the difficulty in discriminating between them. It is worth noting that neither the original nor modified version of this Figure 5 . The number of participants in Experiment 2 who showed evidence of using the two patterning rules or the biconditional rule during posttraining transfer tests. Rule use was defined according to whether the participants gave ratings beyond a particular criterion value (high literacy ratings had to be greater than the positive criterion value and low literacy ratings had to be less than the negative criterion value).
model anticipates the present observation that the single CSs in the patterning discriminations acquire positive or negative associative value more rapidly than do the patterning compounds (see Figure 6 ). Pearce's (1987 Pearce's ( , 1994 configural model also solves the biconditional discrimination faster than the patterning discriminations (see simulation in Figure 6 ). This is because its generalization rule predicts greater generalization of associative strength between a compound and its individual stimuli (as occurs in patterning discriminations) than between compounds containing a common stimulus (as in biconditional discriminations). When solving discriminations, the model is sensitive to overlap between different stimulus patterns-as might arise from perceptual similarity between the stimuli, or from common context cues-because this overlap affects generalization between different configural units. However, our efforts to incorporate these factors into simulations of the model have failed to reveal any change in the rank-ordering of the biconditional and patterning tasks. That is, regardless of similarity between stimuli, or the presence of a common context, the model consistently predicts that the biconditional discrimination is solved more quickly than the patterning discriminations.
In contrast to their implication for configural models, the present results provide support for elemental models of stimulus representation. In particular, they are consistent with the elemental model recently proposed by Harris (2006) , since the processes by which stimuli are represented in that model have greater difficulty solving a biconditional discrimination than negative or positive patterning discriminations. However, the model reaches a solution to these discriminations more easily if it assumes that the different stimuli share elements in common-elements that are common to two stimuli make the compound of those stimuli more discriminable from the single stimuli, and from other compounds, because they are activated more strongly in that specific compound than at other times. Importantly, although this improves the model's ability to solve both patterning and biconditional discriminations, its impact is greater for the biconditional discrimination. This is illustrated in Figure 6 that contains a simulation of the model in which each element in any stimulus had a 5% chance of being common to any other stimulus (i.e., any two stimuli shared, on average, 5% of their elements in common).
The present results also provide qualified support for the elemental model described by McLaren and Mackintosh (2002) . Although this model tends to solve biconditional discriminations faster than patterning discriminations, it is sensitive to the proportion of elements common to the stimuli-an increase in common elements retards the biconditional discrimination more than the patterning discrimination. Thus, the model can solve a patterning discrimination faster than a biconditional one when there is very large overlap between the stimuli (e.g., Figure 6 simulates performance assuming 95% overlap). However, under circumstances in which the model predicts faster learning on the patterning discriminations than the biconditional discrimination, it also predicts a much larger difference than was observed in either experiment between the single CSs and compounds in the patterning discriminations.
